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CENTRAL AMERICAN PINAlfCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
SUMMARY 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and 3ef frey Poyo 
The efficient operation of Central America's financial sys-
tems can play a key role in renewed growth and structural trans-
formation in the region. Through monetization, intermediation, 
and reserve-management services the financial system contributes 
to market integration, the savings-investment process, and eco-
nomic development. These contributions of finance depend on the 
size of the financial sector, in real terms, and on the transac-
tions costs imposed on market participants. With the recent cri-
sis, financial flows declined and transactions costs increased. 
These results reflected a conflict between these functions of fi-
nance and its role as a fiscal instrument. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Central America experienced a 
significant process of financial deepening. This progress was a 
consequence of rapid output growth and price and exchange-rate 
stability, which in turn reflected cautious fiscal and monetary 
policies. Numerous institutions were created, the network of 
branches was expanded, and financial magnitudes increased, in 
real terms and as a proportion of the GDP. Markets remained 
fragmented, however, and the Central American economies continued 
to rely heavily on foreign savings. The urban bias of financial 
development and high transactions costs excluded large segments 
of the population from access to deposit and loan services. 
The Central American financial systems suffered a major blow 
with the crisis. The financing of fiscal deficits with domestic 
credit led to inflation, devaluation, the contraction of the real 
size of the financial system, and the crowding out of the private 
sector in domestic credit portfolios. This contraction was not 
uniform; it was at the expense of the private sector, of the mo-
bilization of deposits in domestic currency, of the regulated 
segment of the market, of the share of productive sectors in loan 
portfolios, and of the access of the smaller, poorer, riskier 
producers to financial services. 
The financial systems of Central America are dominated by 
the banking sector, which plays a key role in the savings-in-
vestment process. Reluctance to let the market allocate resources 
has led to the nationalization of the banking system in three 
countries, to the creation of public development banks and in-
vestment corporations, to selective credit controls, to confis-
catory reserve requirements, to restrictions to entry into 
financial markets and to market segmentation, as well as to 
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interest-rate ceilings and preferential rediscounting programs. 
Most of these interventions have been unsuccessful and have 
further increased transactions costs. 
The most important challenge for the Central American f inan-
cial systems will be to provide access to financial services to 
large segments of the population. This will require policy and 
procedure reforms, in order to create a hospitable regulatory en-
vironment. It will also require cost-reducing financial innova-
tions, in order to reduce the costs faced by ~epositors, borrow-
ers and intermediaries. High transactions costs reduce the net 
returns on deposits to savers, increase the total costs of the 
funds for investor-borrowers, and jeopardize the financial via-
bility of regulated intermediaries. Efficient institutions have 
to be designed, their staff and management need to be trained, 
and appropriate incentives have to be created. Technologies, 
institution building, and policy reforms will then reinforce each 
other. This is a difficult and expensive task, which requires 
external assistance for research, experimentation, training, and 
financing set up costs. Excessive inflows of foreign financial 
assistance, however, may take away the incentives to mobilize do-
mestic resources and may transform existing financial institu-
tions into mere conduits for donor targeted, concessionary funds. 
This would further increase financial repression and postpone 
financial market development. 
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CENTRAL AMERICAN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
This is a critical period for Central America. Recent geo-
political, social, and economic problems far surpass the diffi-
culties experienced in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, 
when the region's export earnings sharply declined. High social 
costs have resulted from the present crisis in view of its depth, 
its duration, and its impact on each country's institutional 
framework and political and social fabric. Multiple, accelerat-
ing, and dramatic changes have been transforming the political 
and economic structures of the five countries. As a result, the 
destiny of the region will be molded during the next few years. 
The ways in which present economic and political problems will be 
solved will determine the type of society and the level of wel-
fare to be enjoyed by the Central Americans during the rest of 
the century. 
Political turmoil, insurrection, and the prospects for peace 
have attracted most of the substantially increased international 
attention that has recently focused on Central America. Although 
less emphasized, economic stagnation and instability have also 
been a major component of the recent history of the region. In 
the 1980s all five countries have experienced stagnant or con-
tracting output; an even more rapid decline of their internation-
al trade, including intraregional trade; growing unemployment and 
underemployment; huge public-sector deficits and the correspond-
ing public exte~nal debt; increasing open or repressed inflatjon-
ary pressures; and the implicit or explicit devaluation of their 
currencies. These difficulties have been in sharp contrast with 
a record of rapid economic growth and sustained price and for-
eign-exchange stability during the previous two decades. 
Numerous plans and programs have been proposed to deal with 
these problems. A common set of responses has been to request, 
on the one hand, and to offer, on the other, substantially in-
creased amounts of foreign financial assistance. Large inflows 
of foreign aid, however, may represent a far more complex and 
difficult exercise than is usually assumed, while the increased 
availability of external funds may undermine the will to under-
take some of the policy reforms that are essential for renewed 
economic growth. This is not the place, however, to resolve the 
issues about the role and dangers of large inf lows of foreign 
aid. Rather, the purpose of this analysis is to examine the role 
of the domestic financial system in mobilizing and in more eff i-
ciently allocating local resources, in order to facilitate stabi-
lization, structural adjustment, and the resupmtion of rapid out-
put growth. 
This chapter discusses the importance of the financial sec-
tor for economic development, the process of financial deepening 
that preceeded the crisis in Central America, and the impact of 
the recent financial repression on the size and performance of 
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the banking sector. Financial deepening is a process of accumu-
lation of financial assets at a rate faster than the accumulation 
of non-financial wealth. When financial deepening takes place, 
the real value of key financial magnitudes grows, while the rates 
of return of financial assets are high. A process of financial 
deepening reflects the efficiency with which the services of the 
financial sector are being provided. The opposite is financial 
repression, characterized by the slow or even negative growth of 
the real value of financial magnitudes. Financial repression 
usually reflects incorrect policy interventions. This chapter 
also examines the nature of the Central American financial sys-
tems and of the policies that influence their performance and it 
explores opportunities for their improvement. 
1. The Importance of Financial Deepening 
The role of the financial system and the nature of its con-
tributions to economic growth have received increasing attention. 
These contributions are associated with the provision of at least 
four types of service. The most basic is the monetization of the 
economy, that is, the provision of a medium of exchange. This 
service reduces the costs of conducting transactions in the mar-
kets for commodities and for factors of production, it increases 
the flow of trade, and it enlarges market size. These effects, 
in turn, improve the productivity of resources, through special-
ization and the division of labor, greater competition, the use 
of modern technologies, and the exploitation of economies of 
scope and economies scale. 
The efficiency of the monetization effort is reduced by in-
flation and currency substitution (dollarization). In order to 
avoid the negative impact of inflation, economic agents substi-
tute tangible assets (real estate, inventories, jewelry) and for-
eing currencies for the domestic money. The domestic currency is 
no longer considered an efficient medium of exchange and store of 
value. The funds shifted into inflation hedges, however, provide 
little social returns. Correct macroeconomic management, which 
avoids inflation, is thus crucial for adequate monetization. 
The financial system also provides services of intermedia-
tion between savers and investors, thus enhancing the accumula-
tion of capital and improving its allocation. In the absence of 
financial markets, many producers are condemned to take advantage 
of their opportunities only to the extent allowed by their own 
resources. In other cases, when their resources are abundant com-
pared to their productive options, savers are forced to invest 
those resources at low marginal rates of return. There is no rea-
son to expect that those with the capacity to save, at a given 
moment, are necessarily those with the best investment opportuni-
ties. By making the division of labor between savers and inves-
tors possible, financial intermediaries channel resources from 
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producers and regions with a limited growth potential and poor 
productive opportunities to those where a more rapid expansion of 
output is possible. 
Through the provision of intermediation services, therefore, 
the financial system contributes to the elimination of inferior 
uses of resources and, at the same time, it facilitates better 
alternative uses of these resources. This is accomplished when 
the financial system offers wealthholders new assets (for exam-
ple, bank deposits) that are more attractive forms of holding 
wealth than the unprofitable uses of resources thus eliminated. 
The intermediary, in turn, transfers these claims on resources to 
others, who possess better investment opportunities. From this 
perspective, the financial system offers valuable services and 
income-increasing opportunities not only to borrowers, but also 
to depositors. Financial policies must create a balance, there-
fore, between the incentives offered to depositors (to attract 
their savings) and those offered to borrowers (to promote invest-
ment). Many credit programs and institutions in Central America, 
however, have relied heavily upon international donor funds and 
central bank rediscounting, thus ignoring the provision of depos-
it services, while financial policies have repressed the rewards 
offered to depositors. 
The financial system also facilitates the reduction of risk 
and the management of liquidity and reserves. Most economic 
agents accumulate stores of value for emergencies or to take ad-
vantage of future investment opportunities. In the absence of 
attractive domestic financial assets, they are forced to hold 
foreign currencies, real estate and other tangible assets (in-
ventories, animals, jewelry) that yield low social returns. The 
financial system reduces the costs and risks of holding precau-
tionary and speculative reserves when it offers attractive forms 
of holding wealth. At the same time, it reduces the size of the 
required reserves, provided it offers open lines of credit when 
needed, and thus releases resources for immediately productive 
uses. 
Finally, the financial system provides services of fiscal 
support for the public sector. This is an important contribution, 
in view of weak tax systems and of the absence of markets for se-
curities. While the first three functions (monetization, inter-
mediation, and reserve management) are complementary, this fiscal 
function of the financial system may be in conflict with the for-
mer three. When abused, this fiscal role may lead to inflation, 
devaluation, and the crowding out of the private sector from do-
mestic credit portfolios. When this happends, the financial sys-
tem ceases to be an intermediary between private savers and in-
vestors and it becomes a fiscal instrument to tax resources away 
from depositors, in order to finance the public-sector's current 
expenditures. Financial policy must strive to strike a balance 
in the provision of these alternative services. 
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In summary, economic development both depends upon and con-
tributes to the growth and diversification of the financial sys-
tem. Financial deepening matters to the extent to which it inte-
grates markets; provides incentives for savings and investment; 
encourages savers to hold a larger proportion of their wealth in 
the form of domestic financial assets, rather than in unproduc-
tive inflation hedges, foreign assets, and other money substi-
tutes; and channels resources away from low-return towards better 
alternative uses. The extent to which these services are provided 
depends on the size of the financial system in real terms; that 
is, on the purchasing power of domestic financial assets. It also 
depends on the efficiency of its performance, as measured by the 
magnitude and dispersion of the transactions costs that are im-
posed on all market participants, actual and potential. 
Market fragmentation, the small size of the transactions, 
the high costs of information, risk and uncertainty increase the 
costs of financial transactions in developing countries. As a re-
sult, the net returns to depositors are low, the total costs of 
the funds to borrowers (including their non-interest expenses) 
are high, the size of financial markets is small, the volume of 
the funds channelled and the variety of the services provided are 
limited, and time horizons are short. Financial progress requires 
a reduction of these risks and transactions costs. This cannot be 
done by decree, as attempted, for example, by usury laws. Rather, 
financial progress requires greater competition and market inte-
gration, the exploitation of economies of scale and of economies 
of scope, professional portfolio management and portfolio diver-
sification, the accumulation of information, and the establish-
ment of bank-customer relationships. Financial progress thus re-
quires a hospitable regulatory and macroeconomic policy environ-
ment, viable institutions, and innovations in financial technolo-
gy, in order to reduce risks and transactions costs. 
2. Pinancial Deepening in Central America 
During the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Central American 
countries experienced a significant process of financial deepen-
ing and financial markets served as an important mechanism for 
economic growth. The evolution of the Central American financial 
markets compared favorably with financial progress in other dev-
eloping countries, in terms of the traditional measures of per-
formance, such as the number, diversity, and growth of financial 
institutions, the ratio of monetary aggregates to national in-
come, and the proportion of national savings captured by the f i-
nancial system. 
During that period, numerous institutions were established 
and the range of services offered was widened; competition in fi-
nancial markets increased; the network of bank branches was sub-
stantially expanded; the returns to domestic financi~l assets 
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were positive, in real terms; and financial magnitudes, measured 
in constant prices, grew rapidly. Sustained economic growth and 
price and exchange-rate stability produced this progress, even in 
the absence of explicit concern for financial development. 
In effect, up to the mid-1970s, the Central American econ-
omies were characterized by remarkable price stability. During 
1950-1969, the annual increase of the consumer price index ranged 
from 0.3 percent for El Salvador, to 3.4 percent for Nicaragua, 
with rates of inflation in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras of 
the order of one to two percent per year. None of these countries 
experienced double-digit inflation until 1973. 
In these very open economies, the domestic price level was 
essentially determined by stable international prices, given a 
fixed exchange rate. Exchange-rate stability reflected, in turn, 
the willingness to adopt the fiscal and credit discipline that is 
required by a fixed exchange-rate system. The central banks of 
the region revealed a preference for monetary stability and had 
the power to maintain it. In effect, during the 1950s and the 
1960s, the rate of monetary expansion averaged less than 10 per-
cent per year in each one of these countries, despite the fact 
that incomes were growing rapidly and that the demand for money 
was increasing at an even faster pace. Costa Rica, the only Cen-
tral American country that had to devalue in the 1960s, experi-
enced a slightly higher rate of monetary growth (12 percent per 
year). Even during the 1970s, the average rate of monetary expan-
sion for Central America was only 14 percent per year. Domestic 
credit, in turn, grew 11 percent per year in the 1960s and 18 
percent annually in the 1970s, when inflationary pressures began 
to mount. As a consequence of openness and of exchange-rate sta-
bility, therefore, inflation was allien to the Central American 
economies until the mid-1970s. 
The resulting significant degree of financial deepening was 
reflected by the growth of the ratio of the money supply (M2), in 
the broad sense of currency and demand, savings, and term depo-
sits, to the gross domestic product (GDP). For the region as a 
whole, this ratio increased from 15 percent in the early 1960s to 
30 percent in the late 1970s. Table 1 reports, for the whole of 
Central America, the ratios of the major monetary and domestic-
credi t aggregates with respect to the GDP. These figures reflect 
a sustained process of financial deepening through the 1970s. 
Table 2 presents, for each one of the countries, the ratios 
of the money supply in a broad sense (M2) to the GDP, at the end 
of selected years. By 1961, this ratio was highest in El Salva-
dor and Costa Rica, intermediate in Guatemala, and lowest in Hon-
duras and Nicaragua. These ratios became comparatively high in 
the mid-1970s, particularly with respect to other Latin American 
countries that experienced sustained inflationary pressures and 
more acute financial repression. Nevertheless, as the process of 
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financial deepening slowed down, this ratio reached a maximum in 
1976 in Guatemala (25 percent) and El Salvador (33 percent); in 
1978 in Honduras (30 percent); in 1979 in Nicaragua (31 percent); 
and in 1980 in Costa Rica (35 percent). These figures exclude 
deposits in foreign currency. The lower ratio in Guatemala pos-
sibly reflected the presence of large subsistence sectors, while 
Honduras was the country that experienced the most rapid improve-
ment since the early 1960s. 
Table 1 
Central America: Ratios of the Major Monetary and Credit Aggre 
gates to the Gross Domestic Product. 1961-1981. 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 
Currency 5.9 5.5 5.1 5.8 5.9 
Demand Deposits 5.0 5.8 6.4 7.6 6.3 
Money (Ml) 10.9 11. 3 11.5 13.4 12.2 
Quasi money 4.4 7.6 10.9 15.6 16.6 
Money Supply (M2) 15.3 18.8 22.4 28.9 27.5 
Domestic Credit _ 19.6 23.9 27.2 32.8 41. 3 
Private Sector 16.1 19.5 22.4 26.1 25.0 
Public Sector 3.5 4.4 4.8 6.6 16.4 
Source: Computed from data in the Boletin Estadistico, San Jose, 
Costa Rica: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. 
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Table 2 
Central America: Ratios of the Money Supply (M2) to the Gross 
Domestic Product. 1961-1986. 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 
Costa Rica 18.0 18.3 27.7 31.9 28.8 44.2 
El Salvador 19.7 23.0 24.8 32.9 33.7 35.0 
Guatemala 13.9 17.7 19.8 25.2 23.1 24.9 
Honduras 12.9 16.7 24.7 30.9 28.0 30.6 
Nicaragua 11. 7 18.0 17.3 28.1 32.2 50.8 ~/ 
~/ This figure reflects problems of measurement for Nicaragua, 
since there is abundant evidence about disintermediation in 
real terms in this country. 
Source: Computed from data in the Boletin Estadistico, San Jose, 
Costa Rica: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. 
Most of this impressive process of financial deepening re-
sulted from the growth of quasimoney (that is, savings and term 
deposits, rather than currency and demand deposits). For Central 
America, the ratio of quasimoney to the GDP increased from 4 per-
cent in 1961 to 16 percent by 1978. This growth reflected the 
diversification of financial portfolios, in order to satisfy di-
verse tastes for returns, risk, and liquidity. Also, as infla-
tionary pressures increased, transaction balances were kept in 
new forms, different from checking accounts. Deposits denominated 
in US dollars also augmented in relative importance, particularly 
in recent times. This reflected the process of currency substi-
tution associated with the crisis. Deposits in dollars accounted 
for 11 percent of the Costa Rican GDP in 1983, the country where 
dollarization was more substantial. 
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Table 3 
Central America: Ratios of Domestic Credit to the Gross Domestic 
Product. 1961-1985. 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1985 
Costa Rica 31.9 33.8 36.6 39.1 25.0 40.7 
El Salvador 26.6 26.9 30.7 34.8 57.7 54.2 
Guatemala 14.5 18.1 17.5 19.7 28.2 38.6 
Honduras 11.8 16.2 31.1 43.5 44.7 56.9 
Nicaragua 16.8 27.2 30.4 46.3 78.4 99.6 ~/ 
~/ The figures for Nicaragua reflect important measurement 
errors. 
Source: Computed from data in the Boletin Estadistico, San Jose, 
Costa Rica: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. 
This increasing mobilization of financial resources through 
the banking system made possible the rapid expansion of credit. 
For the region as a whole, the ratio of domestic credit to the 
GDP grew from 20 percent in the early 1960s to 35 percent in the 
late 1970s (See Table 1). As shown in Table 3, already by 1961 
there were important differences among the Central American coun-
tries in this respect. At that time, these ratios ranged between 
12 percent for Honduras and 32 percent for Costa Rica. The sus-
tained differences observed for the whole period resulted from 
different degrees of use of central bank credit (inflation tax) 
and of foreign savings, to complement domestic resource mobiliza-
tion, particularly during the more recent years. 
Despite financial deepening, the Central American economies 
continued to rely heavily on foreign savings for the financing of 
their domestic investment. Moreover, domestic financial markets 
remained highly fragmented, in part as a reflection of underdev-
elopment, and partly as a consequence of financial policies. A 
significant degree of urban bias has also characterized the ex-
pansion of the banking system. The network of bank branches and 
the flow of deposits and of loans have been concentrated in the 
few major cities. 
Only a small proportion of the total population has had ac-
cess to the financial services offered. Lack of access has been 
acute in the rural areas. The proportion of farmers with access 
to institutional loans has been less than 15 percent for the re-
gion as a whole and has ranged from less than five p~rcent in 
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Guatemala to over 30 percent in Costa Rica. The loan portfolios 
of the financial institutions have also shown much concentration. 
Among those priviledged enough to have access to the loans, a few 
have captured the largest proportion of the funds loaned. For ex-
ample, in the case of agricultural loan portfolios, about 10 per-
cent of the number of borrowers have received about 85 percent of 
the amounts disbursed. This has happened even in Costa Rica, de-
spite the nationalization of the banking system in 1948. Loan de-
linquency and default have also been increasing. The unpaid loans 
have thus represented additional transfers of resources to rela-
tively wealthy borrowers. 
High transactions costs have been incurred by all financial 
market participants. In many cases these costs have been so high, 
that they have excluded large segments of the Central American 
population from participation in formal credit markets. Govern-
ment intervention has accentuated market fragmentation and has 
further increased transaction costs. This intervention has taken 
the form of interest-rate restrictions, selective credit alloca-
tions, high and differentiated reserve requirements, preferential 
rediscounting schemes, and restrictions to entry into financial 
actitivities. The increased financial repression that has re-
sulted from the recent economic and financial crisis has accent-
uated all of these shortcomings of the Central American financial 
systems. The number of bank clients has declined, the concentra-
tion of credit portfolios has increased, and transactions costs 
have augmented.·-
Table 4 
Central America: Proportion of Domestic Credit Outstanding Cap-
tured by the Public Sector. 1961-1985. 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1985 
Costa Rica 12.9 17.1 16.7 23.0 46.7 52.4 
El Salvador 14.9 15.9 17.3 16.7 51.0 44.8 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Source: 
25.2 27.3 27.4 36.9 40.4 49.4 
23.4 17.5 20.3 19.7 31.9 36.5 
14.3 9.9 4.6 3.8 29.6 50.7 
Computed from data in the Boletin Estadistico, San 
3ose, Costa Rica: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. 
Several years. 
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3. Financial Represion: The Impact of the Crisis 
The Central American countries have been in the midst of an 
acute economic crisis. The difficulties have resulted from a com-
bination of long-term trends and unfavorable short-term circum-
stances, both foreign and domestic. The long-term, structural de-
terminants of the crisis have reflected a contradiction between 
the region's basic characteristics (small, open economies, abun-
dant in labor and with very specialized natural resources) and 
the features of the protectionist strategy of development adopted 
in the late 1950s. The penalization of agriculture and the bias 
against exports have produced high costs and distortions. The 
short-term determinants of the crisis, on the other hand, have 
reflected major external shocks, political turmoil, and the un-
fortunate domestic policies adopted in response to the shocks. 
The external influences have included sharp swings in the re-
gion's international terms of trade and drastic changes in the 
conditions of its access to international financial markets. 
The Central American financial systems have suffered signif-
icantly with the crisis, probably more than any other sector in 
the economy. There has been essentially a fiscal reason for this. 
When the stagnation and contraction of real incomes in the early 
1980s reduced the rate of growth of government revenues (which in 
some cases became negative even in nominal terms), the Central 
American governments faced severe political and administrative 
constraints for an additional mobilization of domestic resources 
with the use of the conventional tools of taxation. It became 
difficult to increase taxes in the middle of an economic reces-
sion, given pessimistic expectations and intense capital flight. 
Several attempts at tax reform did not bear the desired revenues. 
At the same time, public-sector expenditures and implicit, non-
recorded subsidies and entitlements kept growing, at rates in-
creasingly faster than those associated with revenues. Moreover, 
the absence of a significant securities market precluded any sub-
stantial placement of government debt with the private sector. 
Given the increasing discrepancy between public-sector rev-
enues and expenditures, for a while the authorities financed bud-
get deficits by placing their debt abroad. This has been particu-
larly substantial in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua and significant 
in the other countries. When the limit to the stock of public ex-
ternal debt which foreign lenders were willing to accumulate was 
finally reached and programmed expenditures had not been reduced 
yet, the Central American governments forced the placement of 
their debt with the domestic financial system. Table 4 reports 
how the proportion of domestic credit captured by the public sec-
tor increased substantially in the five countries. 
Domestic financing of public-sector deficits had two conse-
quences. Too rapid an expansion of domestic credit led to the 
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loss of international monetary reserves, to accelerating infla-
tion, and eventually to devaluation. The rate of domestic credit 
expansion was no longer compatible with price and exchange-rate 
stability. On the other hand, the private sector was crowded out 
of domestic credit portfolios. Thus, growing fiscal deficits 
were financed with the loss of international monetary reserves, 
accelerating borrowing abroad and, finally, with the inflation 
tax and the financial repression of the private sector. 
To avoid the inflation tax, the Central Americans revised 
their wealth portfolios, reduced their holdings of domestic fi-
nancial assets, and increased their holdings of tangible assets 
(inflation hedges) and of foreign assets (currency substitution). 
Controls over interest rates and exchange rates, combined with 
inflation and devaluation expectations, fueled capital flight. 
Among the consequences was a contraction of the domestic f inan-
cial systems, as inflation eroded the real value of credit port-
folios and of deposit liabilities and as economic agents moved 
away from domestic currencies. All previously growing financial 
magnitudes declined, when measured in real terms and as a propor-
tion of the GDP. 
Table 5 
Central America: Inflation Rates (Annual Percentage Changes in 
the Consumer Price Index). 1982-1986. 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Costa Rica 37.0 90.l 32.6 12.0 15.l 11.8 
El Salvador 14.8 11.7 13.l 11.7 22.3 31.9 
Guatemala 11.5 5.0 6.4 3.6 18.0 37.0 
Honduras 9.4 9.0 8.3 4.7 3.4 4.4 
Nicaragua 23.9 24.8 31.0 35.4 219.5 681.6 
Source: Boletin Estadistico. San Jose, Costa Rica: Consejo Mone-
tario Centroamericano. 1986. 
Table 5 shows how inflation accelerated in Costa Rica in the 
early 1980s and in all of the other countries, except Honduras, 
in the mid-1980s. Relative price stability in Honduras has re-
flected substantial inflows of foreign financial assistance. Fis-
cal control and foreign assistance allowed Costa Rica to reduce 
the rate of inflation to more moderate levels in the mid-1980s. 
Table 6 shows how financial deepening proceeded at an excep-
tionally rapid pace during most of the 1970s. This process was 
12 
reversed, however, in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. The ex-
tent and the timing of the disintermediation differed from coun-
try to country. Due to the use of uniform dates in Table 6, these 
differences are not shown in full by this table. 
In Guatemala, the real money supply (M2) grew rapidly in the 
1970s, reached a maximum in 1978, declined - 5.0 percent in 1979, 
and continued to grow through 1982. This was mostly due to ex-
panding holdings of quasimoney. Inflation accelerated after 1983, 
as a consequence of a rapid expansion of domestic credit, partic-
ularly for the public sector. In real terms, domestic credit de-
clined during the most recent years. The contraction has been 
dramatic in El Salvador, where political difficulties have been 
added to economic problems. The broad money supply (M2) declined 
Table 6 
Central America: Annual Average Rates of Growth of Monetary and 
Credit Aggregates, in Real Terms. 1970-1986. 
Guatemala 
Money Supply (Ml} 
1970-1978 
1978-1982 
1982-1986 
Money Supply 
1970-1978 
1978-1982 
1982-1986 
(M2} 
Domestic Credit 
1970-1978 
1978-1982 
1982-1986 
1.0 
- 2.4 
3.1 
9.0 
3.8 
0.1 
8.2 
16.5 
- 6.1 
Domestic Credit for 
the Private Sector 
1970-1978 
1978-1982 
1982-1986 
6.6 
7.4 
- 3.3 
El Salvador 
-
1.0 
- 6.2 
- 3.4 
1.1 
- 6.4 
2.4 
6.8 
4.9 
6.6 
6.8 
- 7.9 
- 2.3 
Honduras 
9.3 
- 1. 4 
1. 8 
9.7 
- 0.5 
6.8 
10.6 
2.2 
8.1 
9.8 
- 1.8 
8.2 
Costa Rica 
11.3 
- 3.7 
4.7 
16.7 
- 3.6 
4.3 
13.4 
- 8.3 
10.2 
11. 5 
- 15.3 
6.1 
Data for Nicaragua are too unreliable, so they are not re-
ported here. 
Source: Computed from data in the Boletln Estadistico, San Jose, 
Costa Rica: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. 
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rapidly after 1977 and by 1983 it represented only 72 percent of 
its 1977 level. Money in a narrow sense (Ml) represented 59 per-
cent of its 1977 level. In Honduras, where the contraction has 
been less acute, the dollarization of deposits has been signifi-
cant. Low levels of inflation in this country have been due to 
massive inflows of foreign assistance, which have made it possi-
ble to divert inflationary pressures towards imports and to f i-
nance them with the loss of reserves. The contraction was dra-
matic in Costa Rica. The money supply (M2) had grown more rap-
idly than in the other countries, but it then declined. By 1982, 
the real money supply was only 74 percent of its 1978 value. 
As a result of the contraction of the real size of the fi-
nancial system, the ratio of M2 to the GDP declined in the four 
countries (data for Nicaragua are not reliable). In Costa Rica, 
this ratio dropped from 41 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1981. 
If dollar-denominated deposits are excluded, the reduction was 
from 35 to 21 percent. In El Salvador, this ratio diminished 
from 33 percent in 1976 to 29 percent in 1980. 
The rapid expansion of domestic resource mobilization that 
took place during the 1970s made the increase of domestic credit 
possible. In Costa Rica, real domestic credit increased through 
1980, helped by increasing borrowing abroad by the banking sys-
tem, but it then declined -30.4 percent in 1981 and -22.4 percent 
in 1982. This last year, its real value was only 54 percent of 
the 1980 level. That is, the inflationary pressures generated by 
the rapid expansion of domestic credit (in nominal terms) eventu-
ally resulted in a contraction of its real value. In the race 
between growth of domestic credit in nominal Colones and infla-
tion, the latter was the easy winner. A similar process took 
place later in Guatemala and in El Salvador. 
The proportion of domestic credit allocated to the public 
sector was fairly constant during the 1960s and early 1970s, when 
it ranged between 17 and 20 percent of the total. During the se-
cond half of the 1970s, however, it increased rapidly. By 1982, 
it was 44 percent for Central America. That year, the proportion 
of domestic credit granted to the public sector ranged between 34 
percent in Honduras and 51 percent in El Salvador (See Table 4). 
Domestic credit for the private sector grew exceptionally 
fast in Costa Rica in the 1970s, and afterwards it dramatically 
declined. By 1982, domestic credit for the private sector repre-
sented only 49 percent of its 1978 value. That is, the private 
sector was receiving less than one-half of the purchasing power 
that it obtained from the banks a few years earlier. Domestic 
credit for the public sector continued growing after 1978, but 
eventually it also declined. By 1982, domestic credit for the 
public sector represented only 58 percent of its 1980 value. The 
clear lesson is: too rapid an expansion of domestic credit, in 
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nominal terms, resulted in reduced real credit flows, even for 
the public sector. 
While this contraction of the real flows of domestic credit 
was taking place, the flows of external credit were also being 
curtailed, and inflation was severely reducing the real value of 
the working capital of firms. Therefore, the financial crunch 
was acute from all sources. Moreover, significant portions of 
the portfolio of the banking system, particularly in the case of 
the government-owned banks, became overdue. Since defaulted loans 
have not been written off, the volumes of credit outstanding re-
ported here overestimate the true availability of loanable funds. 
The decline of these financial ratios has also reflected, in 
part, the loss in relative market share of the regulated, insti-
tutionalized market, for which the central banks report statis-
tical information. In recent years, there has been almost every-
where a vigorous development of non-regulated financial institu-
tions. Not constrained by central-bank and interest-rate regula-
tions, these intermediaries have been more aggressive than the 
formal market in the mobilization of domestic resources. In this 
sense, the reduction in the levels of financial intermediation 
has been less than reported here. 
The contraction of the Central American financial sectors 
has not been uniform. The private sector has been crowded out 
from domestic credit portfolios, while the public sector has sig-
nificantly increased its share. Non-regulated intermediaries have 
gained the expense of institutional markets, while dollar-denomi-
nated deposits have expanded at the expense of deposits in domes-
tic currencies. The share of "productive" sectors in credit port-
folios, particularly that of agriculture, has declined, while the 
share of more "speculative" activities has increased. 
With inflation and devaluation, the opportunity cost of 
holding domestic financial assets has increased. These assets 
have become poor stores of value and have forced savers to look 
for alternative ways to hold wealth. As a result, the financial 
sector has shrunk. This, in turn, has reflected an abuse of the 
fiscal function of financial markets, which has reduced their 
ability to promote stability and growth. This is unfortunate, 
because financial intermediation is critical during periods of 
structural adjustment and resource reallocation. 
4. Financial Market Structure 
One of the main features of the financial systems of Central 
America is the predominance of the banking sector and, within his 
sector, the dominant role of the commercial banks. As in other 
developing countries, open markets for common stocks, mortgages, 
bonds, or even commercial bills are inexistent or insig.nif icant. 
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This simply reflects the low levels of per capita income and the 
resulting small scale of individual savings and investment 
transactions. Information is insufficient to have small farmers 
or merchants issue their own notes or shares to be publicly 
traded. As a result, private financial savings are largely held 
in the form of currency and bank deposits. Within the modern 
sector of the economy, bank loans represent the most important 
source of funds for firms, both for working capital and for 
investment. Thus, banks and similar intermediaries play a key 
role in the savings-investment process and in the allocation of 
resources. 
The financial systems of the Central American countries in-
clude commercial banks, mortgage banks, and development banks, as 
well as near banks such as savings and loan associations (with 
the exception of Guatemala) and finance corporations (financie-
~), capitalization companies, and insurance companies. There 
is a wide spectrum of non-regulated intermediaries, as well. In 
Guatemala, bonded warehouses (almacenes de dep6sito) have become 
very important as a source of short-term working capital for pri-
vate firms. 
Table 7 
Central America: Number of Commercial and Development Banks and 
Number of Banlt Branches, 1986. 
Number of Banks Number of Branches Population 
Total Private Public Total Private Public per Off ice 
Costa Rica 17 13 4 248 13 235 9,950 
El Salvador 9 1 8 104 4 100 50,272 
Guatemala 20 17 3 234 147 84 33,775 
Honduras 14 13 1 234 203 31 18,106 
Nicaragua 5 0 5 203 0 203 15,064 
Source: Gula Bancaria Lat1noamericana 1 1986. Bogota, Colombia: 
Federacion Latinoamericana de Bancos. 
In addition, in each one of the countries there is a fairly 
active cooperative movement which also provides financial ser-
vices, although its relative size within the financial system is 
still fairly small. Financial institutions other than the commer-
cial and development banks and credit unions are completely con-
centrated in the large urban centers. In Honduras, for example, 
91 percent of the value of all deposits, 93 percent of the volume 
of loans, and 97 percent of all central-bank rediscounts and for-
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eign-assistance credit flows have been concentrated in Tegucigal-
pa, San Pedro de Sula, and La Ceiba. 
Table 7 presents the number of commercial and development 
banks and the number of branches in each one of the countries. 
The financial systems of Guatemala and Honduras have been com-
posed predominantly of private-sector institutions. With the 
crisis, however, the public development banks have maintained a 
priviledged access to central-bank rediscounting and to funds 
from international donors, while the private banks have faced se-
vere constraints on funds mobilization and lending activities. 
Thus, there have been important changes in market shares. 
The Costa Rican banking system was nationalized in 1948 and 
only the four public commercial banks have been allowed to mobil-
ize demand deposits and savings accounts from the public. Only 
these banks have enjoyed access to central-bank rediscounting. 
Recently, however, private banks, which are allowed to offer only 
long-term certificates of deposit, have gained in market share at 
the expense of the nationalized banks. This has reflected both 
the rigidity and obsolescense of the public banks, which had be-
come used to operating without competition, and the aggressive 
behavior of the private banks, heavily supported by USAID (the 
U.S. Agency for International Development) with loanable funds in 
the form of long-term lines of credit and quasi-capital contribu-
tions. This support has reflected the shift of USAID programs 
from the public to the private sector, in an effort to strengthen 
private enterprise and the market forces. On the other hand, the 
banking systems of Nicaragua and El Salvador were also recently 
nationalized, at a time when there has been this increasing pri-
vatization trend in Costa Rica. While the recent developments in 
Costa Rica have been fueled by growing unhappiness with the pub-
lic banks, those other two countries have placed all of their 
trust in the ability of the public sector to become an efficient 
financial intermediary. 
Costa Rica possesses not only the lowest ratio of population 
per bank branch in Central America but, it has also the third 
lowest ratio in Latin America, after Uruguay and Trinidad-Tobago. 
In addition, a large portion of this network are rural branches 
(Juntas Rurales de Credito Agricola), created in 1914, which have 
allowed a greater penetration of the countryside with credit than 
in the other countries. Access to banking services, on the other 
hand, has been most restricted in El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Attempts to develop a securities market in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua have failed. Recently much emphasis has been placed on 
such an objective in Honduras and Guatemala, on the other hand. 
The creation of a stock market in Honduras, however, is still in 
the planning stages and a very small stock exchange is function-
ing in Guatemala. In the case of Costa Rica, the overwhelming 
proportion of the stock exchange transactions, both in number and 
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in volume, involve public-sector debt instruments. Private-sec-
tor participation has steadily grown over the past ten years, 
particularly as financial repression reduced the relative impor-
tance of the banking system, but the trading in shares is still 
insignificant even in Costa Rica. More than a market for shares, 
the stock exchange in this country has been a market for obliga-
tions. 
5. Financial Policies and Regulation 
Banks have been frequently criticized for contributing lit-
tle to economic development. Commercial banks have been seen as 
too averse to risk and as too slow to supply credit for new, non-
traditional, new investment opportunities. The ostensible justi-
fication for the nationalization of banking in Central America 
has been the presumed unwillingness of private banks to channel 
resources to priority sectors. The pool of financial savings has 
been perceived as a kind of a "public good," whose optimal use 
can be achieved only if the state intervenes in the process of 
financial intermediation. The experience of Costa Rica, where 
banks have been nationalized for four decades, raises serious 
doubts about the advantages of nationalization in practice. The 
government banks have been slow, conservative, and vulnerable to 
political pressures. With their bureaucratic procedures, they 
have imposed high transactions costs on their customers. Rigid 
institutional structures, inadequate incentives, and inconsistent 
objectives have made them increasingly unable to respond to the 
dynamic demands of a complex economy in transformation. Nation-
alized banks in El Salvador and Nicaragua have discovered that a 
simple change of ownership is not enough to improve performance. 
Similarly, the region's public development banks have exhibited a 
sad record of portfolio management and financial viability. 
In addition to nationalization, several policies and regula-
tions have been used to redirect funds towards preferred sectors. 
With the assistance from international donors, several special-
ized public development banks (particularly agricultural banks) 
were established throughout the region in the mid-1950s, in order 
to target loans, at preferential interest rates, to specific sec-
tors. Many of these banks have gone bankrupt several times, but 
they re-emerge, with a new name and under new management. Fre-
quently, their portfolio includes a substantial proportion of 
overdue loans, since collection is not a major concern for these 
institutions. Rather, they are conduits for central bank, gov-
ernment, and donor funds that need to be rapidly disbursed for 
political or bureaucratic reasons. Since the interest rates that 
they charge seldom cover their costs and losses from default, 
these banks must be periodically recapitalized, in order to con-
tinue to operate. Similarly, in the mid-1970s several industrial 
and development investment corporations were created (e.g., CODE-
SA in Costa Rica, CONADI in Honduras) to promote the e.stablish-
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ment of new enterprises too big or too risky for the private sec-
tor. These agencies failed, too, mostly because they were run 
with political rather than financial criteria. They are now in a 
process of dismantling or of privatization, with the assistance 
from international donors. 
Attempts have also been made to redirect the resources mo-
bilized by private commercial banks. These have included confis-
catory reserve requirements and selective credit controls. For 
many years the Central Bank of Costa Rica established topes de 
cartera, administratively set ceilings and floors on the amount 
of credit to be granted by sector of economic activity, crop, or 
other specific criteria. These quantitative restrictions on cred-
it failed because the authorities could not adequately predict 
demand. Such controls were futile in the first place, given the 
fungibility of credit. Loans provide the borrower with general-
zed purchasing power and the lender cannot control marginal sub-
stitutions of these funds for other funds under the borrower 1 s 
control. Only a complete account of all of the borrowers sources 
and uses of funds would allow a determination of the actual use 
of the borrowed funds. The Central Bank of Costa Rica no longer 
dictates to the nationalized commercial banks the allocation of 
their portfolio. Rather, it employs reserve requirements and 
open-market operations for general monetary management. 
In most of Central America, high inflation rates combined 
with interest-rate ceilings resulted in negative interest rates 
in real terms in the 1980s, as shown in Table 7. These negative 
rates have jeopardized the ability of the regulated financial in-
stitutions to compete with non-regulated intermediaries and to 
attract deposits from the public. Negative interest rates on 
loans have generated an excess demand for credit, which has re-
quired non-price forms of rationing to clear the market. This ra-
tioning has been frequently based on collateral or on buraucratic 
considerations, rather than on creditworthiness and the selection 
of the best investment projects. Loan approval criteria have been 
vulnerable to the influence of strong pressure groups or to the 
abuse of political power, particularly in the case of the public 
development banks. Negative interest rates have also discouraged 
loans that involve more than a minimal risk and administrative 
costs. These interest rates have not been sufficient to cover 
the costs and risks associated with the administration of a cred-
it portfolio that includes more than a traditional clientele, 
unless the institution has been willing to incur in operating 
losses and to risk getting decapitalized. Thus, to remain finan-
cially viable, many intermediaries have restricted their opera-
tions to the largest and safest of their clients, while smaller, 
poorer, or more innovative producers have been denied access to 
the subsidized loans. These underpriced loans, however, have 
transfered a substantial income subsidy to a few privileged bor-
rowers. While the majority have been excluded from access to 
19 
Table 8 
Central America: Representative Real Interest Rates on Loans and 
Deposits (percentages). 1982-1986. 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Loans: 
Costa Rica - 32.0 - 5.1 12.4 9.7 10.9 
El Salvador 3.4 1.0 2.0 5.3 - 10.4 
Guatemala 7.0 8.2 6.9 - 14.0 - 16.9 
Honduras 10.5 7.6 10.7 9.0 10.0 
Nicaragua 6.5 - 11.4 - 14.9 - 62.3 - 82.7 
Deposits 
Costa Rica - 34.2 8.0 9.9 5.0 6.4 
El Salvador 0.9 2.7 1.8 8.6 - 15.2 
Guatemala 4.1 5.3 9.4 - 16.4 - 19.1 
Honduras 5.3 1. 8 5.0 3.8 4.6 
Nica~agua - 11.4 - 15.6 - 16.5 - 62.7 - 82.8 
Source: Boletin Estadistico, San Jose, Costa Rica: Consejo Mone-
tario Centroamericano, 1986. 
credit and thus to the transfer, only a few have benefited from 
the subsidy. At the same time, the institutions created to pro-
mote development have been destroyed. 
This regressive impact of the subsidy has characterized even 
the nationalized banking systems. During the 1970s the implicit 
subsidy was substantial in Costa Rica. The real rate charged on 
loans during 1974, for example, was a negative -20 percent. Under 
the conservative assumption that the social opportunity cost of 
the funds was 10 percent per year in real terms, the implicit 
rate of subsidy was 30 percent. At that time, agricultural credit 
represented close to 60 percent of the value of the gross agri-
cultural output and over one-half of the loan portfolio of the 
nationalized banks. This meant that, in the important case of 
agriculture, the grant transferred through subsidized credit was 
equivalent to 20 to 25 percent of the value of the gross agricul-
tural output. On the other hand, only between 30 and 40 percent 
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of the agricultural producers had access to bank credit, while 
the remaining 60 to 70 percent were excluded from the subsidy. 
In addition, there was a high degree of portfolio concentra-
tion. In effect, in the case of the Banco Nacional de Costa Ri-
~, which grants over one-half of all agricultural credit in the 
country, less than two percent of the borrowers (number of loans) 
received over 60 percent of the amounts loaned for agriculture. 
About 10 percent of the number of loans corresponded to over 83 
percent of the amount of credit granted. This meant that about 
one percent of the agricultural producers of Costa Rica received 
over 65 percent of the agricultural credit granted by the banks 
and over 65 percent of a substantial subsidy. This subsidy was 
equivalent to almost 25 percent of the value of the agricultural 
output in 1974. 
Due to the decline in inflation rates during the second-half 
of the 1970s, as well as the increase in nominal rates of inter-
est, the magnitude of the subsidy declined, but it remained im-
portant. The subsidy significantly increased again during the 
early 1980s, while concentration of the loan portfolio became 
more accentuated. In addition, by the end of the decade it was 
estimated that about 50 percent of the loan portfolio of the na-
tionalized banks represented defaulted loans. There was a sig-
nificant transfer on this count, too, to the few priviledged very 
large borrowers who did not repay their loans. 
In addition, the banking regulatory structure has severely 
restricted competition among different intermediaries, via in-
terest-rate controls, market segmentation, and loan targeting. 
In view of the recent political and economic instability, more-
over, the maturity of both assets and liabilities has been se-
verely shortened. Improvements in banking technology and the pro-
motion of new financial products have lagged behind developments 
in other countries. In fact, some of the most interesting inno-
vations in the Central American financial markets have ocurred in 
institutions which were originally established outside, and in 
some cases remain outside, the regulated banking system. Higher 
risks and costs are associated, however, with these markets. 
In Costa Rica, particularly in recent years, there has been 
an improvement of the regulatory environment, as the Central Bank 
has attempted to inject a greater degree of competition and effi-
ciency into the financial market. Interest-rate controls have 
been significantly loosened and selective credit allocations have 
virtually disappeared. This has reversed the severe disinterme-
diation trend of the early 1980s. In Honduras, attempts to re-
duce domestic inflation and to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
with the use of substantial foreign financial assistance have 
produced positive real interest rates, too. Nevertheless, it is 
the increasing claim of the public sector on domestic credit that 
has been mostly responsible for the comparatively high real rates 
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of interest rates observed in Honduras and Costa Rica. Attempts 
to artificially reduce these interest rates, however, would only 
lead to greater disintermediation and to excess credit demands 
from the private sector, given the prevailing crowding out ef-
fect. The artificially lower interest rates will not make avail-
able to productive firms the funds that are being captured by the 
government, while the reduced ability to mobilize deposits will 
make loanable funds even more scarce. Only fiscal austerity would 
allow a reduction of the real interest rates in these countries. 
In Guatemala, on the other hand, there have been no signifi-
cant attempts to liberalize financial markets, which continue to 
operate under a rather repressive regulatory framework. Finally, 
in both El Salvador and Nicaragua, state intervention in f inan-
cial markets has been expanded, with the complete elimination of 
competition for and market allocation of funds, and the transfor-
mation of this sector into a public monopoly. Unfortunately, the 
problems that the nationalization of these banking systems has 
set out to resolve are more intractable than this simplistic so-
lution assumes, while nationalization itself may create distorted 
incentives for the operation of these institutions, which may 
lead to unexpected and unintended results. 
6. Financial Market Development 
The most important challenge for the Central American f inan-
cial systems is to provide access to a wide set of financial ~er­
vices for the majority of the population, particularly in the ru-
ral areas. The provision of financial services, however, is a 
difficult and expensive task. Success will depend upon many fac-
tors. These include key features of the environment, the degree 
of organization of society, the impact of non-financial and of 
financial policies, the design of financial institutions and in-
struments, and the choice of appropriate technologies to produce 
financial services. ' 
The features of underdevelopment explain in part the diff i-
cul ties. Potential depositors and borrowers are very heteroge-
neous, they are geographically dispersed, their transactions are 
small, and they face high risks. It is difficult for intermedia-
ries from outside the local communities to acquire and interpret 
information about their creditworthiness. The result are high 
transactions costs, which increase the total cost of funds for 
borrowers, reduce the net returns on deposits for savers, and 
diminish the profitability of potential intermediaries. Lenders 
perceive that the costs of managing numerous small savings ac-
counts and of determining the creditworthiness of small, diverse 
producers are too high, given the scarcity of information, and 
the nature of the risks involved. 
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What matters for production and investment decisions is the 
total cost of borrowed funds. In addition to interest payments, 
the total cost of borrowing includes explicit and implicit non-
interest costs, such as legal, document, and registration fees, 
commissions, forced purchases of other financial services, taxes, 
transportation and lodging expenses, the opportunity cost of the 
time spent in conducting the loans transactions and in preparing 
investment plans, the costs of entertaining bank officials, and 
bribes. Compensating balances required from borrowers, delays in 
the disbursement of funds, and insuficcient financing which re-
sults in lower yields also increase borrowing costs. 
What matters for savings is the net return to depositors, 
which are reduced by taxes, penalties for early withdrawal, lod-
gind and transportation expenses, and the opportunity cost of the 
time spent in depositing and withdrawing funds. In turn, inter-
mediation margins must cover mobilization and lending costs, to 
generate a profit for the intermediary. These costs include the 
administrative expenses associated with deposit accounts, promo-
tion costs, the impact of reserve requirements, loan handling 
costs (documentation, record-keeping, disbursement), and costs to 
reduce the risk of default (loan evaluation, monitoring, super-
vision, and collection), as well as the losses due to lack of 
prompt payment. 
All components of these transactions costs are high in Cen-
tral America. _In the case of the nationalized banking system of 
Costa Rica, the average non-interest costs of borrowing for agri-
cultural loans were 11.5 percent per year, to be added to average 
interest payments of 13.6 percent per year. Moreover, while in-
terest rates ranged between a. o and 26. 5 percent, non-interest 
borrowing costs ranged between o. 2 and 117. 5 percent per year. 
This enormous dispersion of transactions costs across borrowers 
reflected a negative correlation with loan and farm size. These 
costs made financial transactions prohibitive for the smaller, 
poorer, more remote potential borrowers. 
Lending costs have also been high, particularly in the rural 
areas. In Honduras, in 1982 lending costs averaged 18.8 percent 
for an agricultural development bank and 8.4 percent for the 
agricultural loans of a major private commercial bank. A substan-
tial portion of these lending and borrowing costs has been asso-
ciated with the rationing mechanisms which are necessary in the 
presence of excess demands for credit, given under-equilibrium 
interest rates. These transactions costs have also been related 
to the loan targeting usually required by international donors 
and to the screening, documentation, supervision, and extensive 
reporting requirements that are inevitably associated with a mul-
titude of separate special lines of credit and with selective 
credit controls. 
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Insufficient organization also increases the costs and risks 
of financial transactions. If property rights are not adequately 
defined and if contracts cannot be simply specified and success-
fully enforced, only the least risky financial transactions take 
place. In the absence of proper land titles, the offer of ade-
quate collateral is not be possible. This institutional defici-
ency slows down the penetration of the banks in the countryside. 
When there are no efficient, impartial courts, loan contracts 
have no meaning and banking is shallow. When information is ex-
pensive, unreliable, and not accessible, the most important input 
in the financial production function is missing. Where there are 
no roads, people cannot visit bank branches. Where potential cus-
tomers cannot read or write, they cannot fill a loan application 
and communications are more costly. Where there is no adequate 
supervision of the financial system, depositors will not be pro-
tected. 
Economic policies that repress growth and incomes in specif-
ic sectors of the economy (for example, policies that repress ru-
ral incomes) constrain deposit and loan demand and reduce credit-
worthiness. The strength of financial institutions depends on 
the solvency and dynamism of their clientele. Producers who re-
ceive low prices for their output, pay high prices for their in-
puts, obtain poor yields, and do not have access to markets and 
to public services are not good bank clients. For these reasons, 
the crisis not only shrank the size of financial markets, but it 
also reduced the quality of loan portfolios, given the deteriora-
tion of the ecoriomic situation of the banks' clientele. · 
As pointed out, rigid financial policies also contrain the 
growth of financial markets. Inflation and devaluation expecta-
tions, combined with interest-rate ceilings, reduce the net re-
turns to be earned on domestic financial assets and lead to cur-
rency substitution, the accumulation of financial hedges, and the 
contraction of the financial system. The financing of fiscal de-
ficits with bank credit leads to the crowding out of the private 
sector in credit portfolios. 
In a highly restrictive regulatory environment, with binding 
interest-rate ceilings and a significant excess demand for cred-
it, where bankers are protected from competition by barriers to 
entry and to exit and by market segmentation, it is not surpris-
ing that banks do not go out of their way to venture into risky 
territory; they simply ration credit to the least risky and cost-
ly clientele. The ability to evaluate and take risks, which is 
the banks' most important function, is never tested or exercised. 
The internal rate of return or cash flow of a particular project 
becomes of secondary importance, while the supply of collateral 
takes the place of project and creditworthiness evaluation. In 
this environment, financial market regulation provides incentives 
and government sanction for the oligopolistic behavior of banks. 
Reforms of the regulatory framework should attempt to reduce the 
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degree of specialization in financial markets, as experienced has 
shown even in the much larger financial markets of the United 
States, and they should promote the ability to diversify, geogra-
phically, and in terms of maturities and loan uses. 
Financial liberalization is not easy, however. Although in-
creased competition will provide incentives for innovation in fi-
nancial products and technology, it may at the same time increase 
fragility. There are difficulties in the transition, when the 
detailed rules under which the banks have become used to operate 
are modified and these institutions are given greater degress of 
freedom and are forced to formulate strategies and accept respon-
sibility for their decisions. To head off potential negative ef-
fects of the reforms, significant improvements must be made in 
the banking supervision functions of the monetary authorities 
(superintendency of banks). In addition, training programs would 
be an important instrument with which to improve the managerial 
abilities of bank executives and to increase their capacity to 
flexibly respond to a more competitive environment. 
Design contributes to the success or failure of financial 
institutions. Multiple and inconsistent objectives, frequently 
found in public development banks, reduce institutional viabili-
ty. Undue specialization increases risks and the potential for 
moral hazard. In particular, the absence of deposit mobilization 
activities seriously weakens financial institutions. Specialized 
retailers of central bank or donor funds have been particularly 
unsuccessful. Unless authority for the evaluation of creditwor-
thiness and for the collection of loans is granted and account-
ability is specified, the intermediary will be crippled. Polit-
ical intrusion must also be avoided. 
The evaluation of risk requires information. Mutual organi-
zations and other base-level institutions, such as credit unions, 
have a comparative advantage in servicing low-income groups, in 
view of their access to the relevant information and a favorable 
cost structure. Their financial strength derives from the mobili-
zation of local deposits. Policies directed to linking these in-
termediaries to the regulated, institutionalized financial mar-
kets, by improving their access to funds and providing technical 
assistance, may significantly improve access to financial ser-
vices by the marginal populations. 
The development of securities markets may help to redistri-
bute risks more efficiently. The ability to attract investors 
directly, through the sale of shares, would improve access to fi-
nancial markets on the part of entrepreneurs with relatively 
risky projects, who at present cannot obtain the necessary re-
sources. Development of the securities market would also reduce 
the very high levels of credit leverage which characterize Cen-
tral American firms. An excessive reliance on debt, rather than 
equity, has been one of the weaknesses of the Central American 
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private sector. Again, a concerted effort to produce the required 
information is indispensable if such a market is to be developed. 
Given the small size of the market, uncertainties about the fu-
ture, and the high costs of information, nevertheless, it will 
take a long time for a securities market to significantly contri-
bute to economic development. Efforts towards improvement of the 
financial systems of Central America, therefore, should not focus 
entirely, not even as a priority, on the development of stock ex-
changes. Financial market development in the region will conti-
nue to rest largely upon progress of the banking industry. 
For all of these purposes, cost-reducing innovations will be 
needed, in order to increase access to financial services and to 
improve their quality. Incorrect incentives have stunted finan-
cial innovation in the past in Central America. Once the regula-
tory framework becomes more hospitable and financial prices are 
allowed to reflect true scarcities, however, institutional ex-
perimentation and product development will be needed. 
7. Conclusions 
Renewed economic growth and structural transformation in 
Central America will require a substantial reallocation of re-
sources, innovation, the ability to identify and take advantage 
of new and different productive opportunities, and the capacity 
to evaluate and_take reasonable risks. The efficient performance 
of the financial system, particularly in its intermediation func-
tion, will be a key determinant of the success of these efforts. 
The contributions of the financial system will depend on the vol-
ume of resources mobilized, on the ability of the market partici-
pants to identify the investment projects with the highest social 
marginal rates of return, and on the efficiency of the financial 
transactions. Such eff icienty will be mostly reflected by the 
magnitude and the dispersion of the transactions costs imposed on 
all market participants, both actual and potential, and by the 
divergence of marginal rates of return in the economy. 
A sharp reduction in the real value of financial flows has 
accompanied the recent economic and political crisis in Central 
America. This reduction has severely constrained the availabili-
ty of loanable funds for investment and for working capital. The 
contraction has had a fiscal root. Inflation, devaluation, and 
the crowding out of the private sector in domestic credit portfo-
lios have been the result of large fiscal deficits financed with 
bank credit. A reduction of this financial repression will re-
quire the restablishment of fiscal and monetary discipline. Suc-
cessful macroeconomic management, therefore, is a major precondi-
tion for the efficient performance of the Central American f inan-
cial sector. 
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High transactions costs, which already reflected the conse-
quences of underdevelopment, have been augmented by unnecessarily 
detailed regulations and restrictions on the operations of f inan-
cial intermediaries. Transactions costs have also been increased 
by the targeting of loans through a multitude of concessionary 
credit lines (for specific crops, inputs, or investments), each 
one with its own eligibility conditions, lending terms, and re-
porting requirements. Because of the fungibility of money, how-
ever, targeting does not guarantee additionality. In most cases, 
there is little correlation between the proposed use of the funds 
and the marginal activity actually promoted by the loan. Target-
ing, on the other hand, increases transactions costs and makes 
apparently "cheap'' credit expensive. These transactions costs 
have reduced the net returns to saver-depositors, have increased 
the total effective costs of the funds for investor-borrowers, 
have endangered the financial viability of banks and of other 
financial institutions and, in particular, have excluded impor-
tant segments of the population from access to financial ser-
vices, specially in the rural areas. 
The most important challenge for the Central American f i-
nancial systems, therefore, is to provide increasing access to 
financial services for the majority of the population, in ways 
which contribute to growth and structural transformation. For 
this, an appropriate policy and regulatory environment has to be 
established, new cost-reducing financial innovations have to be 
designed, tested, and adapted to the local circumstances, and 
viable institutions have to be promoted. This is a difficult and 
expensive undertaking. 
If the policy environment is not hospitable, financial in-
termediaries will not survive. Positive real rates of interest 
on deposits and loans, non-preferential interest rates on central 
bank rediscounting, low and uniform reserve requirements, and 
limited targeting are the most basic goals of policy reform. The 
extent and timing of these reforms must reflect the initial con-
ditions and the political and administrative constraints in each 
country. An efficient division of labor and increasing competi-
tion between formal and informal intermediaries and among differ-
ent institutional types (public development banks, private com-
mercial banks, credit unions) must be promoted. The ultimate goal 
should be to create a market in which cost-efficient linkages 
among different types of participants guarantee the smooth opera-
tion of the whole system. The use of urban banks as wholesalers 
and of rural credit unions as retailers of funds, for example, is 
an attractive possibility. Increased competition and stronger 
linkages would make it possible, in turn, to use the power of fi-
nance to assist in the integration of other markets. 
Appropriate policies and regulation, however, are not a suf-
ficient condition for financial progress. Given the magnitude 
and disperion of transactions costs, only lower-cost technologies 
• 
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for deposit and loan activities will increase the access of large 
segments of the population to financial services and will make 
the intermediaries which provide these services viable. New fi-
nancial technologies are needed to take advantage of socially 
profitable opportunities for expanding financial markets, for re-
ducing uncertainty, and for managing risk. Institutional and 
technological innovations will have to be adapted to the size of 
the Central American financial markets. Appropriate financial 
technologies are essential for the economic use of resources in 
the operation of financial institutions and in order to reduce 
transactions costs. Technologies, institution building, and pol-
icy reforms must reinforce each other. Substantial efforts will 
be required, however, to implement the policy reforms, create vi-
able institutions, and accelerate cost-reducing technological 
progress. 
Most of the programs for economic recovery in Central Ameri-
ca have assigned no active role to the domestic financial sys-
tems. At best, financial intermediaries have been perceived as 
convenient conduits to channel foreign funds, most likely to tar-
get beneficiaries and in concessionary terms, in order to take 
advantage of the established network of branches and insti tu-
tions. Domestic deposit mobilization, the other side of the in-
termediation process, has been completely ignored. There is not 
only neglect of the functions of finance, but also potential dam-
age. Too much foreign financial assistance, disbursed through 
the existing financial systems, may take the incentives to mobi-
lize domestic resources away and may make it possible to postpone 
overdue reforms needed for renewed growth, stability, and effi-
ciency. Development of the domestic financial markets, on the 
other hand, will be a difficult exercise. Policy and•procedure 
reforms, experiments, and learning processes are expensive. Ex-
ternal assistance can play a useful role, not only in inducing 
the changes, but also in helping to finance the set up costs, 
including research, training, and technical assistance, and in 
sharing in the costs associated with changes in institutional 
structures and procedures. To make these efforts successful, 
however, a clear understanding of the nature and role of finance 
and of the preconditions for the efficient performance of the 
system is essential. 
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Notes 
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of Economics at the Ohio State University and Jeffrey Poyo is the 
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se. This paper was prepared for the International Commission on 
Central American Recovery and Development. The authors are grate-
ful for the comments of Prof. William Asher from Duke University 
on an earlier version. 
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